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Abstract
Natural language inference (NLI) is an in-
creasingly important task for natural language
understanding, which requires one to infer
whether a sentence entails another. However,
the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic
inferences remains understudied. We create
an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic
dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semi-
automatically generated sentence pairs illus-
trating well-studied pragmatic inference types.
We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT,
InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on
MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make
pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI
appears to contain very few pairs illustrat-
ing these inference types, we find that BERT
learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It re-
liably treats scalar implicatures triggered by
“some” as entailments. For some presuppo-
sition triggers like only, BERT reliably recog-
nizes the presupposition as an entailment, even
when the trigger is embedded under an entail-
ment canceling operator like negation. BOW
and InferSent show weaker evidence of prag-
matic reasoning. We conclude that NLI train-
ing encourages models to learn some, but not
all, pragmatic inferences.
1 Introduction
One of the most foundational semantic discover-
ies is that systematic rules govern the inferential
relationships between pairs of natural language
sentences (Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Ch. 6).
In natural language processing, Natural Language
Inference (NLI)—a task whereby a system de-
termines whether a pair of sentences instantiates
in an entailment, a contradiction, or a neutral
relation—has been useful for training and evaluat-
ing models on sentential reasoning. However, lin-
guists and philosophers now recognize that there
∗Equal Contribution
Figure 1: Illustration of key properties of classical en-
tailments, implicatures, and presuppositions. Solid ar-
rows indicate valid commonsense entailments, and ar-
rows with X’s indicate lack of entailment. Dashed ar-
rows indicate follow up statements with the addition of
in fact, which can either be acceptable (marked with
‘7’) or unacceptable (marked with ‘3’).
are separate semantic and pragmatic modes of rea-
soning (Grice, 1975; Clark, 1996; Beaver, 1997;
Horn and Ward, 2004; Potts, 2015), and it is not
clear which of these modes, if either, NLI mod-
els learn. We investigate two pragmatic inference
types that are known to differ from classical en-
tailment: scalar implicatures and presuppositions.
As shown in Figure 1, implicatures differ from en-
tailments in that they can be denied, and presuppo-
sitions differ from entailments in that they are not
canceled when placed in entailment-cancelling en-
vironments (e.g., negation, questions).
To enable research into the relationship be-
tween NLI and pragmatic reasoning, we introduce
IMPPRES, a fine-grained NLI-style diagnostic test
dataset for probing how well NLI models perform
implicature and presupposition. Containing 25.5K
sentence pairs illustrating key properties of these
pragmatic inference types, IMPPRES is automati-
cally generated according to linguist-crafted tem-
plates, allowing us to create a large, lexically var-
ied, and well controlled dataset targeting specific
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instances of both types.
We first investigate whether presuppositions
and implicatures are present in NLI models’ train-
ing data. We take MultiNLI (Williams et al.,
2018) as a case study, and find it has few in-
stances of pragmatic inference, and almost none
that arise from specific lexical triggers (see §4).
Given this, we ask whether training on MultiNLI
is sufficient for models to generalize about these
largely absent commonsense reasoning types. We
find that generalization is possible: the BERT
NLI model shows evidence of pragmatic reason-
ing when tested on the implicature from some to
not all, and the presuppositions of certain triggers
(only, cleft existence, possessive existence, ques-
tions). We obtain some negative results, that sug-
gest that models like BERT still lack a sophisti-
cated enough understanding of the meanings of the
lexical triggers for implicature and presupposition
(e.g., BERT treats several word pairs as synonyms,
e.g., most notably, or and and).
Our contributions are: (i) we provide a new
diagnostic test set to probe for pragmatic infer-
ences, complete with linguistic controls, (ii) to our
knowledge, we present the first work evaluating
deep NLI models on specific pragmatic inferences,
and (iii) we show that BERT models can perform
some types of pragmatic reasoning very well, even
when trained on NLI data containing very few ex-
plicit examples of pragmatic reasoning. We pub-
licly release all IMPPRES data, models evaluated,
annotations of MultiNLI, and the scripts used to
process data.1
2 Background: Pragmatic Inference
We take pragmatic inference to be a relation be-
tween two sentences relying on the utterance con-
text and the conversational goals of interlocu-
tors. Pragmatic inference contrasts with seman-
tic entailment, which instead captures the logical
relationship between isolated sentence meanings
(Grice, 1975; Stalnaker, 1974). We present impli-
cature and presupposition inferences below.
2.1 Implicature
Broadly speaking, implicatures contrast with en-
tailments in that they are inferences suggested by
the speaker’s utterance, but not included in its lit-
eral (Grice, 1975). Although there are many types
1github.com/facebookresearch/ImpPres
Type Example
Trigger Jo’s cat yawned.
Presupposition Jo has a cat.
Negated Trigger Jo’s cat didn’t yawn.
Modal Trigger It’s possible that Jo’s cat yawned.
Interrog. Trigger Did Jo’s cat yawn?
Cond. Trigger If Jo’s cat yawned, it’s OK.
Negated Prsp. Jo doesn’t have a cat.
Neutral Prsp. Amy has a cat.
Table 1: Sample generated presupposition paradigm.
Examples adapted from the ‘change-of-state’ dataset.
of implicatures we focus here on scalar implica-
tures. Scalar implicatures are inferences, often
optional,2 which can be drawn when one mem-
ber of a memorized lexical scale (e.g., 〈some, all〉)
is uttered (see §6.1). For example, when some-
one utters Jo ate some of the cake, they suggest
that Jo didn’t eat all of the cake, (see Figure 1
for more examples). According to Neo-Gricean
pragmatic theory (Horn, 1989; Levinson, 2000),
the inference Jo didn’t eat all of the cake arises
because some has a more informative lexical al-
ternative all that could have been uttered instead.
We expect the speaker to make the most informa-
tive true statement:3 as a result, the listener should
infer that a stronger statement, where some is re-
placed by all, is false.
Implicatures differ from entailments (and, as we
will see, presuppositions; see Figure 1) in that they
are deniable, i.e., they can be explicitly negated
without resulting in a contradiction. For example,
someone can utter Jo ate some of the cake, fol-
lowed by In fact, Jo ate all of it. In this case, the
implicature (i.e., Jo didn’t eat all the cake from
above) has been denied. We thus distinguish im-
plicated meaning from literal, or logical, meaning.
2.2 Presupposition
Presuppositions of a sentence are facts that the
speaker takes for granted when uttering a sentence
(Stalnaker, 1974; Beaver, 1997). Presuppositions
are generally associated with the presence of cer-
tain expressions, known as presupposition trig-
gers. For example, in Figure 1, the definite de-
2Implicature computation can depend on the cooperativity
of the speakers, or on any aspect of the context of utterance
(lexical, syntactic, semantic/pragmatic, discourse). See De-
gen (2015) for a study of the high variability of implicature
computation, and the factors responsible for it.
3This follows if we assume that speakers are cooperative
(Grice, 1975) and knowledgeable (Gazdar, 1979).
scription the cake triggers the presupposition that
there is a cake (Russell, 1905). Other examples of
presupposition triggers are shown in Table 1.
Presuppositions differ from other inference
types in that they generally project out of opera-
tors like questions and negation, meaning that they
remain valid inferences even when embedded un-
der these operators (Karttunen, 1973). The infer-
ence that there is a cake survives even when the
presupposition trigger is in a question (Did Jor-
dan eat some of the cake?), as shown in Figure 1.
However, in questions, classical entailments and
implicatures disappear. Table 1 provides exam-
ples of triggers projecting out of several entail-
ment canceling operators: negation, modals, in-
terrogatives, and conditionals.
It is necessary to clarify in what sense presup-
position is a pragmatic inference. There is no con-
sensus on whether presuppositions should be con-
sidered part of the semantic content of expressions
(see Stalnaker, 1974; Heim, 1983, for opposing
views). However, presuppositions may come to
be inferred via accommodation, a pragmatic pro-
cess by which a listener infers the truth of some
new fact based on its being presupposed by the
speaker (Lewis, 1979). For instance, if Jordan tells
Harper that the King of Sweden wears glasses, and
Harper did not previously know that Sweden has
a king, they would learn this fact by accommo-
dation. With respect to NLI, any presupposition
in the premise (short of world knowledge) will be
new information, and therefore accommodation is
necessary to recognize it as entailed.
3 Related Work
NLI has been framed as a commonsense reason-
ing task (Dagan et al., 2006; Manning, 2006). One
early formulation of NLI defines “entailment” as
holding for sentences p and h whenever, “typi-
cally, a human reading p would infer that h is
most likely true. . . [given] common human under-
standing of language [and] common background
knowledge” (Dagan et al., 2006). Although this
sparked debate regarding the terms inference and
entailment—and whether an adequate notion of
“inference” could be defined (Zaenen et al., 2005;
Manning, 2006; Crouch et al., 2006)—in recent
work, a commonsense formulation of “inference”
is widely adopted (Bowman et al., 2015; Williams
et al., 2018) largely because it facilitates untrained
annotators’ participation in dataset creation.
NLI itself has been steadily gaining in popular-
ity; many datasets for training and/or testing sys-
tems are now available including: FraCaS (Cooper
et al., 1994), RTE (Dagan et al., 2006; Mirkin
et al., 2009; Dagan et al., 2013), Sentences In-
volving Compositional Knowledge (Marelli et al.,
2014, SICK), large scale imaging captioning as
NLI (Bowman et al., 2015, SNLI), recasting
other datasets into NLI (Glickman, 2006; White
et al., 2017; Poliak et al., 2018), ordinal common-
sense inference (Zhang et al., 2017, JOCI), Multi-
Premise Entailment (Lai et al., 2017, MPE), NLI
over multiple genres of written and spoken En-
glish (Williams et al., 2018, MultiNLI), adversar-
ially filtered common sense reasoning sentences
(Zellers et al., 2018, 2019, (Hella)SWAG), ex-
plainable annotations for SNLI (Camburu et al.,
2018, e-SNLI), cross-lingual NLI (Conneau et al.,
2018, XNLI), scientific questioning answering as
NLI (Khot et al., 2018, SciTail), NLI recast-
question answering (part of Wang et al. 2019,
GLUE), NLI for dialog (Welleck et al., 2019),
and NLI over narratives that require drawing in-
ferences to the most plausible explanation from
text (Bhagavatula et al., 2020, αNLI). Other NLI
datasets are created to identify where models fail
(Glockner et al., 2018; Naik et al., 2018; McCoy
et al., 2019; Schmitt and Schu¨tze, 2019), many
of which are also automatically generated (Geiger
et al., 2018; Yanaka et al., 2019a,b; Kim et al.,
2019; Nie et al., 2019; Richardson et al., 2020).
As datasets for NLI become increasingly nu-
merous, one might wonder, do we need yet another
NLI dataset? In this case, the answer is clearly
yes: despite NLI’s formulation as a commonsense
reasoning task, it is still unknown whether this
framing has resulted in models that learn specific
modes of pragmatic reasoning. IMPPRES is the
first NLI dataset to explicitly probe whether mod-
els trained on commonsense reasoning actually do
treat pragmatic inferences like implicatures and
presuppositions as entailments without additional
training on these specific inference types.
Beyond NLI, several recent works introduce
resources for evaluating sentence understanding
models for knowledge of pragmatic inferences.
On the presupposition side, datasets such as
MegaVeridicality (White and Rawlins, 2018) and
CommitmentBank (de Marneffe et al., 2019) com-
pile gradient crowdsourced judgments regarding
how likely a clause embedding predicate is to trig-
ger a presupposition that its complement clause is
true. White et al. (2018) and Jiang and de Marn-
effe (2019) find that LSTMs trained on a gradient
event factuality prediction task on these respective
datasets make systematic errors. Turning to impli-
catures, Degen (2015) introduces a dataset mea-
suring the strength of the implicature from some
to not all with crowd-sourced judgments. Schus-
ter et al. (2020) find that an LSTM with supervi-
sion on this dataset can predict human judgments
well. These resources all differ from IMPPRES in
two respects: First, their empirical scopes are all
somewhat narrower, as all these datasets focus on
only a single class of presupposition or implica-
ture triggers. Second, the use of gradient judg-
ments makes it non-trivial to use these datasets to
evaluate NLI models, which are trained to make
categorical predictions about entailment. Both ap-
proaches have advantages, and we leave a direct
comparison for future work.
Outside the topic of sentential inference,
Rashkin et al. (2018) propose a new task where
a model must label actor intents and reactions for
particular actions described using text. Cianflone
et al. (2018) create sentence-level adverbial pre-
supposition datasets and train a binary classifier
to detect contexts in which presupposition triggers
(e.g., too, again) can be used.
4 Annotating MultiNLI for Pragmatics
In this section, we present results of an annotation
effort that show that MultiNLI contains very lit-
tle explicit evidence of pragmatic inferences of the
type tested by IMPPRES. Although Williams et al.
(2018) report that 22% of the MultiNLI devel-
opment set sentence pairs contain lexical triggers
(such as regret or stopped) in the premise and/or
hypothesis, the mere presence of presupposition-
triggering lexical items in the data does not show
that MultiNLI contains evidence that presupposi-
tions are entailments, since the sentential infer-
ence may focus on other types of information.
To address this, we randomly selected 200 sen-
tence pairs from the MultiNLI matched develop-
ment set and presented them to three expert anno-
tators with a combined total of 17 years of train-
ing in formal semantics and pragmatics.4 Anno-
tators answered the following questions for each
pair: (1) are the sentences P and H related by a
presupposition/implicature relation (entails/is en-
4The full annotations are on the IMPPRES repository.
tailed by, negated or not); (2) what subtype of in-
ference (e.g., existence presupposition, 〈some, all〉
implicature); (3) is the presupposition trigger em-
bedded under an entailment-cancelling operator?
Agreement among annotators was low, suggest-
ing that few MultiNLI pairs are paradigmatic cases
of implicatures or presuppositions. We found only
8 presupposition pairs and 3 implicature pairs on
which two or more annotators agreed. Moreover,
we found only one example illustrating a particu-
lar inference type tested in IMPPRES (the presup-
position of possessed definites). All others were
tagged as existence presuppositions and conversa-
tional implicatures (i.e. loose inferences depen-
dent on world knowledge). The union of anno-
tations was much larger: 42% of examples were
identified by at least one annotator as a presuppo-
sition or implicature (51 presuppositions and 42
implicatures, with 10 sentences receiving diver-
gent tags). However, of these, only 23 presupposi-
tions and 19 implicatures could reliably be used to
learn pragmatic inference (in 14 cases, the given
tag did not match the pragmatic inference, and in
27 cases, computing the inference did not affect
the relation type). Again, the large majority of im-
plicatures were conversational, and most presup-
positions were existential, and generally not linked
to particular lexical triggers (e.g., topic marking).
We conclude that the MultiNLI dataset at best
contains some evidence of loose pragmatic rea-
soning based on world knowledge and discourse
structure, but almost no explicit information rel-
evant to lexically triggered pragmatic inference,
which is of the type tested in this paper.
5 Methods
Data Generation. IMPPRES consists of semi-
automatically generated pairs of sentences with
NLI labels illustrating key properties of implica-
tures and presuppositions. We generate IMPPRES
using a codebase developed by Warstadt et al.
(2019a) and significantly expanded for the BLiMP
dataset (Warstadt et al., 2019b). The codebase, in-
cluding our scripts and documentation, are pub-
licly available.5 Each sentence type in IMPPRES
is generated according to a template that specifies
the linear order of the constituents in the sentence.
The constituents are sampled from a vocabulary
of over 3000 lexical items annotated with gram-
matical features needed to ensure morphological,
5github.com/alexwarstadt/data generation
Premise Hypothesis Relation type Logical label Pragmatic label Item type
some not all implicature (+ to −) neutral entailment target
not all some implicature (− to +) neutral entailment target
some all negated implicature (+) neutral contradiction target
all some reverse negated implicature (+) entailment contradiction target
not all none negated implicature (−) neutral contradiction target
none not all reverse negated implicature (−) entailment contradiction target
all none opposite contradiction contradiction control
none all opposite contradiction contradiction control
some none negation contradiction contradiction control
none some negation contradiction contradiction control
all not all negation contradiction contradiction control
not all all negation contradiction contradiction control
Table 2: Paradigm for the scalar implicature datasets, with 〈some, all〉 as an example.
syntactic, and semantic well-formedness. All sen-
tences generated from a given template are struc-
turally analogous up to the specified constituents,
but may vary in sub-constituents. For instance, if
the template calls for a verb phrase, the generated
constituent may include a direct object or comple-
ment clause, depending on the argument structure
of the sampled verb. See §6.1 and 7.1 for descrip-
tions of the sentence types in the implicature and
presupposition data.
Generating data lets us control the lexical and
syntactic content so that we can guarantee that the
sentence pairs in IMPPRES evaluate the desired
phenomenon (see Ettinger et al., 2016, for related
discussion). Furthermore, the codebase we use al-
lows for greater lexical and syntactic variety than
in many other templatic datasets (see discussion
in Warstadt et al., 2019b). One limitation of this
methodology is that generated sentences, while
generally grammatical, often describe highly un-
likely scenarios, or include low frequency combi-
nations of lexical items (e.g., Sabrina only reveals
this pasta). Another limitation is that generated
data is of limited use for training models, since it
contains simple regularities that supervised classi-
fiers may learn to exploit. Thus, we create IMP-
PRES solely for the purpose of evaluating NLI
models trained on standard datasets like MultiNLI.
Models. Our experiments evaluate NLI models
trained on MultiNLI and built on top of three sen-
tence encoding models: a bag of words (BOW)
model, InferSent (Conneau et al., 2017), and
BERT-Large (Devlin et al., 2019). The BOW
and InferSent models use 300D GloVe embed-
dings as word representations (Pennington et al.,
2014). For the BOW baseline, word embeddings
for premise and hypothesis are separately summed
to create sentence representations, which are con-
catenated to form a single sentence-pair represen-
tation which is fed to a logistic regression softmax
classifier. For the InferSent model, GloVe em-
beddings for the words in premise and hypothesis
are respectively fed into a bidirectional LSTM, af-
ter which we concatenate the representations for
premise and hypothesis, their difference, and their
element-wise product (Mou et al., 2016). BERT
is a multilayer bidirectional transformer pretrained
with the masked language modelling and next se-
quence prediction objectives, and finetuned on the
MultiNLI dataset. We concatenate the premise
and hypothesis after a special [CLS] token and
separated them with the [SEP] token. The BERT
representation for the [CLS] token is fed into clas-
sifier. We use Huggingface’s pre-trained BERT
trained on Toronto books (Zhu et al., 2015).6
The BOW and InferSent models have develop-
ment set accuracies of 49.6% and 67.6%. The
development set accuracy for BERT-Large on
MultiNLI is 86.6%, similar to the results achieved
by (Devlin et al., 2019), but somewhat lower than
state-of-the-art (currently 90.8% on test from the
ensembled RoBERTa model with long pretraining
optimization, Liu et al. 2019).
6 Experiment 1: Scalar Implicatures
6.1 Scalar Implicature Datasets
The scalar implicature portion of IMPPRES in-
cludes six datasets, each isolating a different scalar
implicature trigger from six types of lexical scales
(of the type described in §2): determiners 〈some,
all〉, connectives 〈or, and〉, modals 〈can, have to〉,
numerals 〈2,3〉, 〈10,100〉, scalar adjectives, and
6github.com/huggingface/pytorch-pretrained-BERT/
Figure 2: Results on Controls (Implicatures)
Figure 3: Results on Target Conditions (Implicatures)
verbs, e.g., 〈good, excellent〉, 〈run, sprint〉. Exam-
ples pairs of each implicature trigger can be found
in Table 4 in the Appendix. For each type, we gen-
erate 100 paradigms, each consisting of 12 unique
sentence pairs, as shown in Table 2.
The six target sentence pairs comprise two main
relation types: ‘implicature’ and ‘negated implica-
ture’. Pairs tagged as ‘implicature’ have a premise
that implicates the hypothesis (e.g., some and not
all). For ‘negated implicature’, the premise im-
plicates the negation of the hypothesis (e.g., some
and all), or vice versa (e.g., all and some). Six
control pairs are logical contradictions, represent-
ing either scalar ‘opposites’ (e.g., all and none), or
‘negations’ (e.g., not all and all; some and none),
probing the models’ basic grasp of negation.
As mentioned in §2.1, implicature computation
is variable and dependent on the context of utter-
ance. Thus, we anticipate two possible rational
behaviors for a MultiNLI-trained model tested on
an implicature: (a) be pragmatic, and compute the
implicature, concluding that the premise and hy-
pothesis are in an ‘entailment’ relation, (b) be log-
ical, i.e., consider only the literal content, and not
compute the implicature, concluding they are in a
‘neutral’ relation. Thus, we measure both possible
conclusions, by tagging sentence pairs for scalar
implicature with two sets of NLI labels to reflect
the behavior expected under “logical” and “prag-
matic” modes of inference, as shown in Table 2.
6.2 Implicatures Results & Discussion
We first evaluate model performance on the con-
trols, shown in Figure 2. Success on these controls
is a necessary condition for us to conclude that a
model has learned the basic function of negation
(not, none, neither) and the scalar relationship be-
tween terms like some and all. We find that BERT
performs at ceiling on control conditions for all
implicature types, in contrast with InferSent and
BOW, whose performance is very variable. Since
only BERT passes all controls, its results on the
target items are most interpretable. Full results
for all models and target conditions by implicature
trigger are in Figures 8–13 in the Appendix.
For connectives, scalar adjectives and verbs, the
BERT model results correspond neither to the hy-
pothesized pragmatic nor logical behavior. In fact,
for each of these subdatasets, the results are con-
sistent with a treatment of scalemates (e.g., and
and or; good and excellent) as synonyms, e.g. it
evaluates the ‘negated implicature’ sentence pairs
as ‘entailment’ in both directions. This reveals a
coarse-grained knowledge of these meanings that
lacks information about asymmetric informativity
relations between scalemates. Results for modals
(can and have to) are split between the three la-
bels, not showing any predicted logical or prag-
matic pattern. We conclude that BERT has insuf-
ficient knowledge of the meaning of these words.
In addition to pragmatic and logical interpreta-
tions, numerals can also be interpreted as exact
cardinalities. We thus predict three different be-
haviors: logical “at least n”, pragmatic “at least
n”, and “exactly n”. We observe that results are
inconsistent: neither the “exactly” nor “at least”
interpretations hold across the board.
Figure 4: BERT results for scalar implicatures trig-
gered by determiners 〈some, all〉, by target condition.
For the determiner dataset (some-all), Figure 4
breaks down the results by condition and shows
that BERT behaves as though it performs prag-
matic and logical reasoning in different condi-
tions. Overall, it predicts a pragmatic relation
more frequently (55% vs. 36%), and only 9% of
results are consistent with neither mode of rea-
soning. Furthermore, the proportion of pragmatic
reasoning shows consistent effects of sentence or-
der (i.e., whether the implicature trigger is in the
premise or the hypothesis), and the presence of
negation in one or both sentences. Pragmatic rea-
soning is consistently higher when the implicature
trigger is in the premise, which we can see in the
results for negated implicatures: the some–all con-
dition shows more pragmatic behavior compared
to the all–some condition (a similar behavior is ob-
served with the not all vs. none conditions).
Generally, the presence of negation lowers rates
of pragmatic reasoning. First, the negated im-
plicature conditions can be subdivided into pairs
with and without negation. Among the negated
ones, pragmatic reasoning is lower than for non-
negated ones. Second, having negation in the
premise rather than the hypothesis makes prag-
matic reasoning lower: among pairs tagged as di-
rect implicatures (some vs. not all), there is higher
pragmatic reasoning with non-negated some in the
premise than with negated not all. Finally, we
observe that pragmatic rates are lower for some
vs. not all than for some vs. all. In this final
case, pragmatic reasoning could be facilitated by
explicit presentation of the two items on the scale.
In sum, for the datasets besides determiners, we
find evidence that BERT fails to learn even the log-
ical relations between scalemates, ruling out the
possibility of computing scalar implicatures. It re-
mains possible that BERT could learn these logical
relations with explicit supervision (see Richard-
Presuppositions Label Item
Premise Hypothesis Type
*Trigger Prsp entailment target
*Trigger Neg. Prsp contradiction target
*Trigger Neut. Prsp neutral target
Neg. Trigger Trigger contradiction control
Modal Trigger Trigger neutral control
Interrog. Trigger Trigger neutral control
Cond. Trigger Trigger neutral control
Table 3: Paradigm for the presupposition target (top)
and control datasets (bottom). For space, *Trigger
refers to either plain, Negated, Modal, Interrogative, or
Conditional Triggers as per Table 1.
son et al., 2020), but it is clear that these are not
learned from training on MultiNLI. Only the deter-
miner dataset was informative in showing the ex-
tent of the NLI BERT model’s pragmatic reason-
ing, since it alone showed a fine-grained enough
understanding of the semantic relationship of the
scalemates, like some and all. In this setting BERT
returned impressive results showing a high propor-
tion of pragmatic reasoning compared to logical
reasoning, which was affected by sentence order
and presence of negation in a predictable way.
7 Experiment 2: Presuppositions
7.1 Presupposition Datasets
The presupposition portion of IMPPRES includes
eight datasets, each isolating a different kind of
presupposition trigger. The full set of triggers is
shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. For each type,
we generate 100 paradigms, with each paradigm
consisting of 19 unique sentence pairs. (Examples
of the sentence types are in Table 1).
Of the 19 sentence pairs, 15 contain target
items. The first target item tests whether the model
correctly determines that the presupposition trig-
ger entails its presupposition. The next two alter
the presupposition, either negating it, or replacing
a constituent, leading to contradiction and neutral-
ity, respectively. The remaining 12 show that the
relation between the trigger and the (altered) pre-
supposition is not affected by embedding the trig-
ger under various entailment-canceling operators.
4 control items are designed to test the basic ef-
fect of entailment-canceling operators—negation,
modals, interrogatives, and conditionals. In each
control, the premise is a presupposition trigger
embedded under an entailment-canceling opera-
tor, and the hypothesis is an unembedded sentence
containing the trigger. These controls are neces-
Figure 5: Results on Controls (Presuppositions).
sary to establish whether models learn that presup-
positions behave differently under these operators
than do classical semantic entailments.
7.2 Presupposition Results & Discussion
The results from presupposition controls are in
Figure 5. BERT performs well above chance
on each control (acc. > 0.33), whereas BOW
and InferSent perform at or below chance. In
the “negated” condition, BERT correctly identi-
fies that the trigger is contradicted by its negation
100% of the time, e.g., Jo’s cat didn’t go con-
tradicts Jo’s cat went. In the other conditions, it
correctly identifies the neutral relation the major-
ity of the time, e.g., Did Jo’s cat go? is neutral
with respect to Jo’s cat went. This indicates that
BERT mostly learns that negation, modals, inter-
rogatives, and conditionals cancel classical entail-
ments, while BOW and InferSent do not capture
the ordinary behavior of these common operators.
Next, we test whether models identify presup-
positions of the premise as entailments, e.g., that
Jo’s cat went entails that Jo has a cat. Recall from
§2.2 that this is akin to a listener accommodating
a presupposition. The results in Figure 6 show
that each of the three models accommodates some
presuppositions, but this depends on both the na-
ture of the presupposition and the model. For in-
stance, the BOW and InferSent models accommo-
date presuppositions of nearly all trigger types at
well above chance rates (acc.  33%). For the
uniqueness presupposition of clefts, these models
generally correctly predict an entailment (acc. >
90%), but for most triggers, performance is less
reliable. By contrast, BERT’s behavior is bimodal.
It always accommodates the existence presupposi-
tions of clefts and possessed definites, as well as
the presupposition of only, but almost never ac-
commodates any presupposition involving numer-
acy, e.g. Both flowers that bloomed died entails
Figure 6: Results for the unembedded trigger paired
with positive presupposition.
There are exactly two flowers that bloomed.7
Finally, we evaluate whether models predict that
presuppositions project out of entailment cancel-
ing operators (e.g., that Did Jo’s cat go? entails
that Jo has a cat). We can only consider such a
prediction as evidence of projection if two condi-
tions hold: (a) the model correctly identifies that
the relevant operator cancels entailments in the
control from the same paradigm (e.g., Did Jo’s cat
go? is neutral with respect to Jo’s cat went), and
(b) the model identifies the presupposition as an
entailment when the trigger is unembedded in the
same paradigm (e.g. Jo’s cat went entails Jo has a
cat). Otherwise, a model might correctly predict
entailment essentially by accident if, for instance,
it systematically ignores negation. For this reason,
we filter out results for the target conditions that
do not meet these criteria.
Figure 7 shows results for the target conditions
after filtering. While InferSent rarely predicts that
presuppositions project, we find strong evidence
that the BERT and BOW models do. Specifi-
cally, they correctly identify that the premise en-
tails the presupposition (acc. ≥ 80% for BERT,
acc. ≥ 90% for BOW). Furthermore, BERT is the
only model to reliably identify (i.e., over 90% of
the time) that the negation of the presupposition is
contradicted. These results hold irrespective of the
entailment canceling operator. No model reliably
performs above chance when the presupposition is
altered to be neutral (e.g., Did Jo’s cat go? is neu-
7The presence of exactly might contribute to poor perfor-
mance on numeracy examples. We suspect MultiNLI annota-
tors may have used it disproportionately for neut. hypotheses.
Figure 7: Results for presupposition target conditions
involving projection.
tral with respect to Jo has a cat).
It is surprising that the simple BOW model can
learn some of the projective behavior of presup-
positions. One explanation for this finding is that
many of the key features of presupposition projec-
tion are insensitive to word order. If a lexical pre-
supposition trigger is present at all in a sentence, a
presupposition will generally arise irrespective of
its position in the sentence. There are some edge
cases where this heuristic is insufficient, but IMP-
PRES is not designed to test such cases.
To summarize, training on NLI is sufficient for
all models we evaluate to learn to accommodate
presuppositions of a wide variety of unembedded
triggers, though BERT rejects presuppositions in-
volving numeracy. Furthermore, BERT and even
the BOW model appear to learn the characteristic
projective behavior of some presuppositions.
8 General Discussion & Conclusion
We observe some encouraging results in §6–7. We
find strong evidence that BERT learns scalar im-
plicatures associated with determiners some and
all. Pragmatic or logical reasoning was not diag-
nosable for the other scales, whose meaning was
not fully understood by our models (as most scalar
pairs were treated as synonymous). In the case of
presuppositions, the BERT NLI models, and BOW
to some extent, perform well on a number of our
subdatasets (only, cleft existence, possessive exis-
tence, questions). For the other subdatasets, the
models did not perform as expected on the basic
unembedded presupposition triggers, again sug-
gesting the model’s lack of knowledge of the basic
meaning of these words. Though their behavior
is far from systematic, this is suggestive evidence
that some NLI models can perform in ways that
correlate with human-like pragmatic behavior.
Given that MultiNLI contains few examples of
the type found in IMPPRES (see §4), where might
our positive results come from? There are two po-
tential sources of signal for the BERT model: NLI
training, and pretraining (either BERT’s masked
language modeling objective or its input word em-
beddings). NLI training provides specific exam-
ples of valid (or invalid) inferences constituting
an incomplete characterization of what common-
sense inference is in general. Since presupposi-
tions and scalar implicatures triggered by specific
lexical items are largely absent from the MultiNLI
data used for NLI training, any positive results on
IMPPRES would likely use prior knowledge from
the pretraining stage to make an inductive leap that
pragmatic inferences are valid commonsense in-
ferences. The natural language text used for pre-
training certainly contains pragmatic information,
since, like any natural language data, it is pro-
duced with the assumption that readers are capa-
ble of pragmatic reasoning. Maybe this induces
patterns in the data that make the nature of those
assumptions recoverable from the data itself.
This work is an initial step towards rigorously
investigating the extent to which NLI models learn
semantic versus pragmatic inference types. We
have introduced a new dataset IMPPRES for prob-
ing this question, which can be reused to evaluate
pragmatic performance of any NLI given model.
Acknowledgments
This material is based upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant
No. 1850208 awarded to A. Warstadt. Any opin-
ions, findings, and conclusions or recommenda-
tions expressed in this material are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the NSF. Thanks to the FAIR NLP & Con-
versational AI Group, the Google AI NLP group,
and the NYU ML2, including Sam Bowman, He
He, Phu Mon Htut, Katharina Kann, Haokun Liu,
Ethen Perez, Richard Pang, Clara Vania for discus-
sions on the topic, and/or feedback on an earlier
draft. Additional thanks to Marco Baroni, Hagen
Blix, Emmanuel Chemla, Aaron Steven White,
and Luke Zettlemoyer for insightful comments.
References
Aristotle. De Interpretatione.
David I. Beaver. 1997. Presupposition. In Handbook
of logic and language, pages 939–1008. Elsevier.
Chandra Bhagavatula, Ronan Le Bras, Chaitanya
Malaviya, Keisuke Sakaguchi, Ari Holtzman, Han-
nah Rashkin, Doug Downey, Scott Wen-tau Yih, and
Yejin Choi. 2020. Abductive commonsense reason-
ing. In Proceedings of the 2020 International Con-
ference on Learning Representations (ICLR).
Samuel R. Bowman, Gabor Angeli, Christopher Potts,
and Christopher D. Manning. 2015. A large anno-
tated corpus for learning natural language inference.
In Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on Empiri-
cal Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages
632–642. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Oana-Maria Camburu, Tim Rockta¨schel, Thomas
Lukasiewicz, and Phil Blunsom. 2018. e-SNLI:
Natural Language Inference with Natural Language
Explanations. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 9539–9549.
Andre Cianflone, Yulan Feng, Jad Kabbara, and Jackie
Chi Kit Cheung. 2018. Let’s do it “again”: A first
computational approach to detecting adverbial pre-
supposition triggers. In Proceedings of the 56th An-
nual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers), pages 2747–
2755, Melbourne, Australia. Association for Com-
putational Linguistics.
Herbert H Clark. 1996. Using language. Cambridge
University Press.
Alexis Conneau, Douwe Kiela, Holger Schwenk, Loı¨c
Barrault, and Antoine Bordes. 2017. Supervised
learning of universal sentence representations from
natural language inference data. In Proceedings of
the 2017 Conference on Empirical Methods in Nat-
ural Language Processing, pages 670–680. Associ-
ation for Computational Linguistics.
Alexis Conneau, Ruty Rinott, Guillaume Lample, Ad-
ina Williams, Samuel Bowman, Holger Schwenk,
and Veselin Stoyanov. 2018. XNLI: Evaluating
cross-lingual sentence representations. In Proceed-
ings of the 2018 Conference on Empirical Methods
in Natural Language Processing, pages 2475–2485.
Association for Computational Linguistics.
Robin Cooper, Richard Crouch, Jan Van Eijck, Chris
Fox, Josef Van Genabith, Jan Jaspers, Hans Kamp,
Manfred Pinkal, Massimo Poesio, Stephen Pulman,
et al. 1994. FraCaS: A framework for computational
semantics. Deliverable D6.
Richard Crouch, Lauri Karttunen, and Annie Zaenen.
2006. Circumscribing is not excluding: A reply to
Manning. Ms., Palo Alto Research Center.
Ido Dagan, Oren Glickman, and Bernardo Magnini.
2006. The PASCAL recognising textual entailment
challenge. In Machine learning challenges. evalu-
ating predictive uncertainty, visual object classifica-
tion, and recognising tectual entailment, pages 177–
190. Springer.
Ido Dagan, Dan Roth, Mark Sammons, and Fabio Mas-
simo Zanzotto. 2013. Recognizing textual entail-
ment: Models and applications. Synthesis Lectures
on Human Language Technologies, 6(4):1–220.
Judith Degen. 2015. Investigating the distribution of
some (but not all) implicatures using corpora and
web-based methods. Semantics and Pragmatics,
8:11–1.
Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and
Kristina Toutanova. 2019. BERT: Pre-training of
deep bidirectional transformers for language under-
standing. In Proceedings of the 2019 Conference
of the North American Chapter of the Association
for Computational Linguistics: Human Language
Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers),
pages 4171–4186, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Associ-
ation for Computational Linguistics.
Allyson Ettinger, Ahmed Elgohary, and Philip Resnik.
2016. Probing for semantic evidence of composition
by means of simple classification tasks. In Proceed-
ings of the 1st Workshop on Evaluating Vector-Space
Representations for NLP, pages 134–139, Berlin,
Germany. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Gerald Gazdar. 1979. Pragmatics, implicature, presu-
position and logical form. Academic Press, NY.
Atticus Geiger, Ignacio Cases, Lauri Karttunen, and
Christopher Potts. 2018. Stress-testing neural mod-
els of natural language inference with multiply-
quantified sentences. In CoRR.
Oren Glickman. 2006. Applied textual entailment.
Bar-Ilan University.
Max Glockner, Vered Shwartz, and Yoav Goldberg.
2018. Breaking NLI systems with sentences that re-
quire simple lexical inferences. In Proceedings of
the 56th Annual Meeting of the Association for Com-
putational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers),
pages 650–655. Association for Computational Lin-
guistics.
H Paul Grice. 1975. Logic and conversation. 1975,
pages 41–58.
Irene Heim. 1983. On the projection problem for pre-
suppositions. Formal semantics: The essential read-
ings, pages 249–260.
Laurence Horn. 1989. A natural history of negation.
University of Chicago Press.
Laurence R Horn and Gregory L Ward. 2004. The
handbook of pragmatics. Wiley Online Library.
Nanjiang Jiang and Marie-Catherine de Marneffe.
2019. Do you know that florence is packed with vis-
itors? evaluating state-of-the-art models of speaker
commitment. In Proceedings of the 57th Annual
Meeting of the Association for Computational Lin-
guistics, pages 4208–4213, Florence, Italy. Associa-
tion for Computational Linguistics.
Lauri Karttunen. 1973. Presuppositions of compound
sentences. Linguistic inquiry, 4(2):169–193.
Tushar Khot, Ashish Sabharwal, and Peter Clark. 2018.
SciTail: A textual entailment dataset from science
question answering. In Proceedings of Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI).
Najoung Kim, Roma Patel, Adam Poliak, Patrick Xia,
Alex Wang, Tom McCoy, Ian Tenney, Alexis Ross,
Tal Linzen, Benjamin Van Durme, Samuel R. Bow-
man, and Ellie Pavlick. 2019. Probing what dif-
ferent NLP tasks teach machines about function
word comprehension. In Proceedings of the Eighth
Joint Conference on Lexical and Computational Se-
mantics (*SEM 2019), pages 235–249, Minneapolis,
Minnesota. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Alice Lai, Yonatan Bisk, and Julia Hockenmaier. 2017.
Natural language inference from multiple premises.
In Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint
Conference on Natural Language Processing (Vol-
ume 1: Long Papers), pages 100–109, Taipei, Tai-
wan. Asian Federation of Natural Language Pro-
cessing.
Stephen C Levinson. 2000. Presumptive meanings:
The theory of generalized conversational implica-
ture. MIT press.
David Lewis. 1979. Scorekeeping in a language game.
In Semantics from different points of view, pages
172–187. Springer.
Yinhan Liu, Myle Ott, Naman Goyal, Jingfei Du, Man-
dar Joshi, Danqi Chen, Omer Levy, Mike Lewis,
Luke Zettlemoyer, and Veselin Stoyanov. 2019.
RoBERTa: A robustly optimized BERT pretraining
approach. arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.11692.
Christopher D. Manning. 2006. Local textual infer-
ence: It’s hard to circumscribe, but you know it
when you see it – and NLP needs it. Ms., Stanford
University.
Marco Marelli, Luisa Bentivogli, Marco Baroni, Raf-
faella Bernardi, Stefano Menini, and Roberto Zam-
parelli. 2014. SemEval-2014 task 1: Evaluation of
compositional distributional semantic models on full
sentences through semantic relatedness and textual
entailment. In Proceedings of the 8th International
Workshop on Semantic Evaluation (SemEval 2014),
pages 1–8, Dublin, Ireland. Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics.
Marie-Catherine de Marneffe, Mandy Simons, and Ju-
dith Tonhauser. 2019. The CommitmentBank: In-
vestigating projection in naturally occurring dis-
course. In Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, vol-
ume 23, pages 107–124.
Tom McCoy, Ellie Pavlick, and Tal Linzen. 2019.
Right for the wrong reasons: Diagnosing syntactic
heuristics in natural language inference. In Proceed-
ings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics, pages 3428–3448,
Florence, Italy. Association for Computational Lin-
guistics.
Shachar Mirkin, Roy Bar-Haim, Ido Dagan, Eyal
Shnarch, Asher Stern, Idan Szpektor, and Jonathan
Berant. 2009. Addressing discourse and document
structure in the RTE search task. In Textual Analysis
Conference.
Lili Mou, Rui Men, Ge Li, Yan Xu, Lu Zhang, Rui Yan,
and Zhi Jin. 2016. Natural language inference by
tree-based convolution and heuristic matching. In
Proceedings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the As-
sociation for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2:
Short Papers), pages 130–136, Berlin, Germany. As-
sociation for Computational Linguistics.
Aakanksha Naik, Abhilasha Ravichander, Norman
Sadeh, Carolyn Rose, and Graham Neubig. 2018.
Stress test evaluation for natural language inference.
In Proceedings of the 27th International Conference
on Computational Linguistics, pages 2340–2353,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA. Association for Com-
putational Linguistics.
Yixin Nie, Yicheng Wang, and Mohit Bansal. 2019.
Analyzing compositionality-sensitivity of NLI mod-
els. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Arti-
ficial Intelligence, volume 33, pages 6867–6874.
Jeffrey Pennington, Richard Socher, and Christopher
Manning. 2014. GloVe: Global vectors for word
representation. In Proceedings of the 2014 Con-
ference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language
Processing (EMNLP), pages 1532–1543, Doha,
Qatar. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Adam Poliak, Aparajita Haldar, Rachel Rudinger,
J. Edward Hu, Ellie Pavlick, Aaron Steven White,
and Benjamin Van Durme. 2018. Collecting di-
verse natural language inference problems for sen-
tence representation evaluation. In Proceedings of
the 2018 Conference on Empirical Methods in Nat-
ural Language Processing, pages 67–81, Brussels,
Belgium. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Christopher Potts. 2015. Presupposition and implica-
ture. The handbook of contemporary semantic the-
ory, 2:168–202.
Hannah Rashkin, Maarten Sap, Emily Allaway,
Noah A. Smith, and Yejin Choi. 2018. Event2Mind:
Commonsense inference on events, intents, and re-
actions. In Proceedings of the 56th Annual Meet-
ing of the Association for Computational Linguis-
tics (Volume 1: Long Papers), pages 463–473, Mel-
bourne, Australia. Association for Computational
Linguistics.
Kyle Richardson, Hai Hu, Lawrence S Moss, and
Ashish Sabharwal. 2020. Probing natural language
inference models through semantic fragments. In
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-20).
Bertrand Russell. 1905. On denoting. Mind,
14(56):479–493.
Martin Schmitt and Hinrich Schu¨tze. 2019. SherLIiC:
A typed event-focused lexical inference benchmark
for evaluating natural language inference. In Pro-
ceedings of the 57th Conference of the Association
for Computational Linguistics, pages 902–914, Flo-
rence, Italy. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Sebastian Schuster, Yuxing Chen, and Judith Degen.
2020. Harnessing the richness of the linguistic sig-
nal in predicting pragmatic inferences. In Proceed-
ings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics.
Robert Stalnaker. 1974. Pragmatic presuppositions. In
Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger, editors, Se-
mantics and Philosophy, pages 135–148. New York
University Press.
Alex Wang, Amapreet Singh, Julian Michael, Felix
Hill, Omer Levy, and Samuel R Bowman. 2019.
GLUE: A multi-task benchmark and analysis plat-
form for natural language understanding. In Pro-
ceedings of the Interantional Conference on Learn-
ing Representations (ICLR).
Alex Warstadt, Yu Cao, Ioana Grosu, Wei Peng, Ha-
gen Blix, Yining Nie, Anna Alsop, Shikha Bordia,
Haokun Liu, Alicia Parrish, Sheng-Fu Wang, Jason
Phang, Anhad Mohananey, Phu Mon Htut, Paloma
Jereticˇ, and Samuel R. Bowman. 2019a. Investi-
gating BERT’s knowledge of language: Five analy-
sis methods with NPIs. In Proceedings of EMNLP-
IJCNLP, pages 2870–2880.
Alex Warstadt, Alicia Parrish, Haokun Liu, Anhad Mo-
hananey, Wei Peng, Sheng-Fu Wang, and Samuel R
Bowman. 2019b. BLiMP: The benchmark of lin-
guistic minimal pairs for English. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1912.00582.
Sean Welleck, Jason Weston, Arthur Szlam, and
Kyunghyun Cho. 2019. Dialogue natural language
inference. In Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meet-
ing of the Association for Computational Linguis-
tics, pages 3731–3741, Florence, Italy. Association
for Computational Linguistics.
Aaron Steven White, Pushpendre Rastogi, Kevin Duh,
and Benjamin Van Durme. 2017. Inference is ev-
erything: Recasting semantic resources into a uni-
fied evaluation framework. In Proceedings of the
Eighth International Joint Conference on Natural
Language Processing (Volume 1: Long Papers),
pages 996–1005, Taipei, Taiwan. Asian Federation
of Natural Language Processing.
Aaron Steven White and Kyle Rawlins. 2018. The role
of veridicality and factivity in clause selection. In
Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the North
East Linguistic Society, Amherst, MA, USA. GLSA
Publications.
Aaron Steven White, Rachel Rudinger, Kyle Rawlins,
and Benjamin Van Durme. 2018. Lexicosyntactic
inference in neural models. In Proceedings of the
2018 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natu-
ral Language Processing, pages 4717–4724, Brus-
sels, Belgium. Association for Computational Lin-
guistics.
Adina Williams, Nikita Nangia, and Samuel Bowman.
2018. A broad-coverage challenge corpus for sen-
tence understanding through inference. In Proceed-
ings of the 2018 Conference of the North American
Chapter of the Association for Computational Lin-
guistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1
(Long Papers), pages 1112–1122. Association for
Computational Linguistics.
Hitomi Yanaka, Koji Mineshima, Daisuke Bekki, Ken-
taro Inui, Satoshi Sekine, Lasha Abzianidze, and Jo-
han Bos. 2019a. Can neural networks understand
monotonicity reasoning? In Proceedings of the
2019 ACL Workshop BlackboxNLP: Analyzing and
Interpreting Neural Networks for NLP, pages 31–40,
Florence, Italy. Association for Computational Lin-
guistics.
Hitomi Yanaka, Koji Mineshima, Daisuke Bekki, Ken-
taro Inui, Satoshi Sekine, Lasha Abzianidze, and Jo-
han Bos. 2019b. HELP: A dataset for identifying
shortcomings of neural models in monotonicity rea-
soning. In Proceedings of the Eighth Joint Con-
ference on Lexical and Computational Semantics
(*SEM 2019), pages 250–255, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Annie Zaenen, Lauri Karttunen, and Richard Crouch.
2005. Local textual inference: Can it be defined or
circumscribed? In Proceedings of the ACL Work-
shop on Empirical Modeling of Semantic Equiv-
alence and Entailment, pages 31–36, Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Rowan Zellers, Yonatan Bisk, Roy Schwartz, and
Yejin Choi. 2018. SWAG: A large-scale adversar-
ial dataset for grounded commonsense inference.
In Proceedings of the 2018 Conference on Empiri-
cal Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages
93–104. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Rowan Zellers, Ari Holtzman, Yonatan Bisk, Ali
Farhadi, and Yejin Choi. 2019. HellaSwag: Can a
machine really finish your sentence? In Proceed-
ings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics, pages 4791–4800,
Florence, Italy. Association for Computational Lin-
guistics.
Sheng Zhang, Rachel Rudinger, Kevin Duh, and Ben-
jamin Van Durme. 2017. Ordinal common-sense in-
ference. Transactions of the Association for Com-
putational Linguistics, 5:379–395.
Yukun Zhu, Ryan Kiros, Rich Zemel, Ruslan Salakhut-
dinov, Raquel Urtasun, Antonio Torralba, and Sanja
Fidler. 2015. Aligning books and movies: Towards
story-like visual explanations by watching movies
and reading books. In Proceedings of the IEEE
international conference on computer vision, pages
19–27.
Appendix
Type Premise Hypothesis
Connectives These cats or those fish appear. These cats and those fish don’t both appear.
Determiners Some skateboards tipped over. Not all skateboards tipped over.
Numerals Ten bananas were scorching. One hundred bananas weren’t scorching.
Modals Jerry could wake up. Jerry didn’t need to wake up.
Scalar adjectives Banks are fine. Banks are not great.
Scalar verbs Dawn went towards the hills. Dawn did not get to the hills.
Table 4: The scalar implicature triggers in IMPPRES. Examples are automatically generated sentences pairs from
each of the six datasets for the scalar implicatures experiment. The pairs belong to the “Implicature (+ to −)”
condition.
Type Premise (Trigger) Hypothesis (Presupposition)
All N All six roses that bloomed died. Exactly six roses bloomed.
Both Both flowers that bloomed died. Exactly two flowers bloomed.
Change of State The cat escaped. The cat used to be captive.
Cleft Existence It is Sandra who disliked Veronica. Someone disliked Veronica.
Cleft Uniqueness It is Sandra who disliked Veronica. Exactly one person disliked Veronica.
Only Only Lucille went to Spain. Lucille went to Spain.
Possessed Definites Bill’s handyman won. Bill has a handyman.
Question Sue learned why Candice testified. Candice testified.
Table 5: The presupposition triggers in IMPPRES. Examples are automatically generated sentences pairs from each
of the eight datasets for the presupposition experiment. The pairs belong to the “Plain Trigger / Presupposition”
condition.
Figure 8: Results for the scalar implicatures triggered by adjectives, by target condition.
Figure 9: Results for the scalar implicatures triggered by adjectives, by target condition.
Figure 10: Results for the scalar implicatures triggered
by determiners, by target condition.
Figure 11: Results for the scalar implicatures triggered
by modals, by target condition.
Figure 12: Results for the scalar triggered by numerals,
by target condition.
Figure 13: Results for the scalar implicatures triggered
by verbs, by target condition.
